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PHILOSOPHY
Thus, to sum up, this book may be interesting
for anyone revelling in the Straussian deconstruction of a text into smallest intertextual hints
and paradoxes, and may, at the same time, be an
interesting read for motivated school-teachers
wanting to demonstrate something like 'the
political actuality of Socrates', who simply
endeavoured to defend 'philosophy', were it to
cost him his life, so that 'we, who know him only
through books, have reason for admiration and
gratitude' (183), as run the final words of the book.
A scholar, however, looking for an innovative, upto-date analysis of the Apology, solidly based on
modem literature and ancient sources, will be
somewhat perturbed by the book's obvious scientific shortcomings.
DAVID ENGELS

Universite libre de Bruxelles
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Plato s Counterfeit Sophists undertakes two main
tasks: to expose Plato's portrayal of the sophists as
distorted and to reintegrate the sophists into the
Greek wisdom tradition (7), that is, to show that
their practices were consistent with their historical
predecessors. The book contains an introduction,
six chapters and a brief methodological appendix.
In the introduction, Tell outlines six characteristics
of sophistic 'otherness', resulting from Plato's
misleading portrayal of the sophists as a homogenous group 'alien' to the Greek wisdom tradition
(6). The sophists are said (a) to constitute a
distinctive group labelled 'sophists'; (b) to charge
fees for instruction; (c) to travel extensively; (d) to
be primarily concerned with rhetoric; (e) to
endorse extreme relativism; (f) to have developed
in response to Athenian social forces. Tell does
not give equal consideration to each criterion; he
treats (a)-(c) in chapters one, two and four, disregards (d) and (e), and deals with (f) in passing over
the course of chapters four and five.
Chapter one, 'The many and conflicting
meanings of O'O<PWTT]<;', argues that the term,
O'O<plO'TT]<;, was contested in antiquity, especially by
Plato and Isocrates, and that to accept Plato's
judgment that the term, with its pejorative implications, be applied to a distinct group, namely
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Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus and others,
is to 'take sides in an ideologically driven battle
over legitimacy' (22). In chapter two, 'Wisdom
for sale?', Tell claims that the accusation that an
intellectual charged fees in exchange for wisdom
was a widespread strategy of invective and that we
should therefore be suspicious of Plato's
'polemical and disparaging portrayal' of the
sophists as extracting payment from their students
(53).
Chapter three, 'Sophoi and concord', marks a
departure from the previous material, in that it
neither takes its starting-point from the criteria of
sophistic distinctiveness laid out in the introduction nor seems to involve any disagreement
with Plato; indeed, in the later chapters, Tell relies
extensively on evidence from Plato to support his
positions. Tell maintains that sophistic reflections
on political concord, or homonoia, are consistent
with and can be traced back to earlier thinkers in
the Greek wisdom tradition, despite the fact that
the term itself is a late fifth-century coinage. In
chapter four, 'Itinerant sophoi', Tell asserts that
the extensive travels of the sophists were in no
way unique to them, that there existed a strong and
traditional 'association between travel and
wisdom', and that the travels of wise men were
made possible by institutional mechanisms of
aristocratic guest-friendship (93). Further, Tell
makes the case that Athens was not the 'permanent
residence' of the sophists and that sophists did not
spend particularly much time there (97). In
chapter five, "Sages at the games', Tell contends
that the Panhellenic centres, like Olympia, served
as traditional meeting places for Greek intellectuals who came to exchange ideas and to put on
displays of wisdom for a mass audience. Chapter
six, 'Competition in wisdom', claims that the
agonistic practices of the sophists were not a
sophistic invention but were rather consistent with
those in the Greek wisdom tradition.
Plato s Counterfeit Sophists fits in with recent
literature aimed at rehabilitating sophistic rhetoric
and argumentation or sophistic theory. However,
rhetoricians and philosophers, not to mention
Plato scholars, may be largely frustrated by this
book. There is hardly any serious discussion of
substantive sophistic claims or arguments, and
Tell's insistence that Plato omits from his
dialogues 'competing accounts' of philosophy and
'characterize [s] the sophists as an intellectually
homogenous group' (6) seems misleading and
tendentious. In numerous dialogues, the legitimacy of the Socratic account of philosophy is
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pitted against various alternative conceptions of
wisdom (for example in Cratylus, Gorgias,
Republic I, Ph ilebus , Ion, etc.). Further, if one
considers the wildly differing portrayals of the
eponymous sophists in Protagoras, Gorgias,
Hippias Minor and Euthydemus, the search for a
definition of 'sophist' in the Sophist, the clear
distinctions he draws out amongst Protagoras,
Hippias and Prodicus in the Protagoras and the
long analysis of Protagorean relativism in the
Theaetetus, it is hard to see how Plato could be
accused of portraying the sophists as monolithic,
or of not taking them seriously.
To the extent that Plato s Counterfeit Sophists
presents a negative judgment on Plato's portrayal
of the sophists, it is, despite its provocative title,
unsuccessful. However, the title is somewhat
misleading, since Tell devotes considerably more
space to the book's positive aim of reintegrating
the sophists into the Greek wisdom tradition. In
this task, Tell is much more effective and
persuasive. Classicists and historians interested in
the historical practices of the sophists will find
Tell's book engaging, though he admits that, due
to the gaps in the historical record, some of his
reflections 'establish conceptual connections'
which do 'not necessarily reflect historical reality'
(152). The later chapters, examining a large
quantity of sources, provide a compelling, if
speculative, historical reconstruction of sophistic
practices and fill a needed gap in the literature.
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Marquette University
franco.trivigno@marquette.edu

BERGES (S.) Plato on Virtue and the Law.
London and New York: Continuum, 2009. Pp.

177. £65. 9781847065926.
doi: I 0.1 017/S0075426913001183

As a welcome counterweight to the tendency
among contemporary moral philosophers to
suppose that the ethics of virtue is an Aristotelian
enterprise, Berges rightly claims a place for Plato
within that tradition.
Chapter 1 sets the discussion in the context of
debates within contemporary virtue ethics: in
contrast to the 'agent-focused' theory of Aristotle
(on which the virtuous agent is a measure of
action, capable of recognizing virtue-independent
values and reasons to act), Plato has a hard-core
'agent-based' theory (on which the rightness or
wrongness of an action is entirely a function of the

virtue of the agent who performs it). To rebut the
charge that agent-based theories cannot provide an
account of political morality, Berges proposes that
the rich vein of Platonic material on the relation
between virtue and law succeeds in developing a
defensible 'virtue jurisprudence'. Chapters 2-7
address questions about law and virtue that arise in
Crito, Menexenus, Gorgias, Republic, Statesman
and Laws, loosely connected as responses to two
sorts of problems that a jurisprudence of virtue
might face: a tension between the inherent particularism of virtue ethics on the one hand and the
generality of law on the other, and a worry that a
virtue-theoretic approach to law will be objectionably paternalistic. Along the way, a number of
other objections to virtue ethics are addressed (for
example the currently popular invocation of
'situationalist' social psychology to challenge the
assumption that virtues have any genuine
influence over behaviour, as well as scepticism
about the unity of the virtues that is affirmed in
most ancient accounts). A final chapter applies the
virtue jurisprudences that emerges from the earlier
discussion to the evaluation of modem democratic
institutions.
Central to Berges' defence of Plato is her
contention that the virtue of concern to Plato
involves wisdom, in particular, the sort of wisdom
cultivated by philosophical dialogue. Thus cultivating citizens' virtue involves nurturing their
capacity for rational reflection, rather than habituating them to mindless obedience. A recurring
theme is that Plato, for all his criticisms of
democracy, does not adhere to an inherently
antidemocratic and authoritarian view of law. His
view is a developing one, and it is in the
Statesman, we are told, that Plato successfully
weds the virtue-theoretic account of legal
judgment to a strong (but not unreasonable)
principle of respect for law. In the Laws, we are
told, there is a new concern for the autonomy of
the citizens, expressed in the requirement that
statutes have persuasive preambles. Here Berges'
proposal that different preambles have different
intended audiences and might themselves be
revised over time (132-38) injects a useful alternative into the currently well-worn debate about
whether the persuasion supplied by those
preambles is
'rational' or 'rhetorical'.
Furthermore, Berges argues, concerns about the
paternalism or authoritarianism of the laws in that
dialogue are to be laid at the door of elements in
Plato's view inessential to the aims of virtue
jurisprudence - for example the invocation of the

